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This Article discusses particular case and legislative developments in
commercial transactions that were reported during the survey period.
While the 1981 crop of commercial transactions cases was meager in
number, several of the reported decisions should be of interest to commer-
cial lawyers. Very little new commercial legislation was enacted. Only
two amendments were passed that directly bear on the commercial law
area. The first amendment added two sections to the Texas Manufactured
Housing Standards Act.' The second amendment enacted a uniform filing
fee for the perfection of certain security interests.2
The 1980 voter approval of the Texas constitutional amendment 3 per-
mitting the use of automated teller machines and electronic fund transfer
systems has caused a rapid increase in the number of automated tellers in
many Texas cities. The automated teller, however, is apparently still too
new a device in Texas to have been the subject of reported cases during the
survey period.4
As has become traditional with the Commercial Transactions Article,
the topics have been organized to reflect the topical order of the Uniform
Commercial Code.5
* B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M., Harvard University. Professor of Law, Texas
Tech University.
1. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221f, §§ 19, 20 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981).
Section 19 relates to manufactured home titles. Section 20 requires the delivery of notice
containing a warning about formaldehyde gas, by a retailer or manufacturer of manufac-
tured homes before transferring title of such homes. For a discussion of these sections, see
notes 31-35, 178-80 infra and accompanying text.
2. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.403(e), .404(c), .405(d), .406 (Vernon Supp.
1982). For a discussion of uniform filing fee, see notes 188-89 infra and accompanying text.
3. The amendment was proposition one on the November 1980 ballot; the full text of
the amendment appears at TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 16(b).
4. Bank lawyers may be interested in reading N. PENNEY & D. BAKER, THE LAW OF
ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER SYSTEMS (1981).
5. The Uniform Commercial Code first became effective in Texas on July 1, 1966.
1965 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 721, §§ 1-101 to 10-105, at 1-316. In 1967 it became part of the
Texas Business and Commerce Code. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 785, §§ 1-6, at 2343-2782.
As amended, the Texas version of the Uniform Commercial Code now conforms closely to
the 1972 official text. In this Article all references are to the Uniform Commercial Code as
enacted in chs. I through 11 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code [hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Code]. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-11.108 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1968 & Supp. 1982).
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I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
(CHAPTER 1)
Choice of Law by Agreement. Section 1.105(a) of the Code provides,
"when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to
another state or nation the parties may agree that the law either of this
state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties." 6
In a Fifth Circuit bankruptcy case, Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutche-
son-Ingram Development Co. ,7 a Mississippi secured creditor had entered
into an equipment lease financing agreement with a Texas debtor. The
agreement provided for payment of an interest rate in excess of that per-
mitted by Texas law, but allowed under Mississippi law. The agreement
further specified Mississippi law as the governing law. Texas clearly had
the more significant contacts with the transaction, but equally clearly, both
Texas and Mississippi bore "reasonable relationships" to the transaction.
In the first hearing, the Fifth Circuit held that the more significant Texas
contacts should control the choice of law, and applied the Texas usury law
to the case.8 Upon rehearing, the court carefully explored the ramifications
of the "significant contacts" doctrine in the general conflicts law and the
"reasonable relationship" test stated by the Code and concluded that a
federal court sitting in a bankruptcy case should apply the Code standard
of "reasonable relationship" when that standard had been statutorily
adopted in both of the jurisdictions involved in the transaction.9 The prior
opinion was withdrawn and an opinion applying section 1.105(a) was sub-
stituted,' 0 stating that because Mississippi had a reasonable relationship to
the transaction, even though it did not have the most significant contacts,
the parties' choice of Mississippi law could stand and the transaction
would not be usurious. "
In another choice of law opinion' 2 the Houston court of civil appeals
held that the "reasonable relationship" test under section 1.105(a) of the
Code should govern the parties' choice of Louisiana law instead of Texas
law when the transaction had a reasonable relation to Louisiana.' 3 The
factors that supported the court's finding that such a relationship existed
were: the plaintiffs principal place of business was in Louisiana; the con-
tract and related documents were negotiated and signed in Louisiana; and
the contract was performed in Louisiana.' 4
6. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
7. 642 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1981).
8. Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 626 F.2d 401, 414
(5th Cir. 1980).
9. Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 642 F.2d 744, 750,
753-54 (5th Cir. 1981).
10. Id. at 745.
11. Id. at 746.
12. First Commerce Realty Investors v. K-F Land Co., 617 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).






A. Formation of Sales Contracts
Additional Written Terms following Oral Agreement. One of the most im-
portant changes in the common law of contracts that was made by chapter
2 of the Code was the rejection of the "mirror-image rule" of contract
formation.15 Under that common law doctrine, no contract could be
formed unless there was a precise match between the terms of an offer and
an acceptance.' 6 The doctrine had the inherent appeal of simplicity and
logical precision; it also, however, had the difficulty of being a legal rule
that was out of step with the way the business world operated. All too
often, the parties might exchange forms that did not precisely match, or
might reach oral agreements that were followed by slightly varying written
confirmations, or might deal on terms that were comfortable for human
beings, but failed to meet the strait jacket exactness of the mirror-image
rule. Under the doctrine, the parties could deal with each other for some
period of time and then, when a dispute arose, learn that an enforceable
contract had never been formed.17
The Code solution to this problem is found in section 2.207,18 which
permits the formation of a contract even though an offer and acceptance
may differ on several terms. New terms contained in an acceptance or
confirmation are treated as proposals for addition to the contract and, be-
tween merchants, such terms become part of the contract unless: (1) the
offer limits acceptance to the terms of the offer or, (2) objection is made to
the additional terms or, (3) the additional terms materially alter the origi-
nal contract. 19 A further change made by the Code is the ability of the
contracting parties to "fill in" the terms of an agreement, which is other-
wise silent, by the parties' course of performance. In such cases, section
2.207(c) 20 operates to form a contract and section 2.20821 applies to deter-
mine the terms developed by a course of performance.
In Preston Farm & Ranch Supply, Inc. v. Bio-Zyme Enterprises22 the Dal-
las court of civil appeals held that a service charge included on monthly
invoice statements became part of the contract between a merchant-seller
15. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.207(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
16. See, e.g., Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915)
when the defendants accepted plaintifl's offer to sell subject to terms other than those pro-
posed in the offer, the court held that this was equivalent to absolute rejection.
17. Many of the difficulties caused by the mirror-image rule were described in hearings
held before the New York Law Revision Commission while the Code was being drafted.
The testimony is reported in 1 N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, 1954 REPORT 119
(1954).
18. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.207 (rex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
19. Id. § 2.207(b).
20. Id. s 2.207(c).
21. Id. § 2.208.
22. 615 S.W.2d 258, 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981), af'd, 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 70
(Nov. 25, 1981). Note that the Texas Writs of Error Table does not show the history of this
case subsequent to the court of appeals decision.
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and two merchant-buyers because, under section 2.207,23 the monthly in-
voice statements were proposals for addition to the contract to which no
objection was made. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the lower
court decision, but not on the section 2.207 rationale of additional terms
contained in an acceptance or confirmation. 24 The supreme court held,
instead, that the course of conduct by the defendant in making continued
purchases and payments according to the invoice terms amounted to an
acceptance of the term imposing a service charge. 25 Section 2.208 was not
cited by the court in reaching this decision, but the opinion seems to be
based on grounds encompassed by that section.26
Open Price Terms. The Code contains a number of "gap-fillers" designed
to supply contract terms omitted by the parties in their agreement. 27 Lan-
drum v. Devenport28 is the most recent addition to the Texas law applying
the gap-filling provisions of the Code. In Landrum the court found that
the parties had intended to make a contract even though the price term
was left open, and further held that the price should be determined by the
jury.29
Precontractual Warning Notice of Health Hazard. In the 1981 legislative
session the Texas Legislature amended the Texas Manufactured Housing
Standards Act.30 Professional sellers of manufactured homes are now re-
quired to provide consumers with a health warning notice describing the
hazards of formaldehyde gas before any contract of sale is signed. 3' Al-
though the statute specifies a form of notice,32 the Texas Department of
Labor and Standards was given the power to prescribe a different form, 33
and the department modified the notice by regulation effective August 26,
23. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.207 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
24. Preston Farm & Ranch Supply, Inc. v. Bio-Zyme Enterprises, 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 70
(Nov. 25, 1981).
25. Id. at 73.
26. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.208(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) provides:
Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance by
either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity
for objection to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or acqui-
esced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the
agreement.
27. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.305(a) (price), .308(1) (place of deliv-
ery), .309(a) (time for delivery) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). For a discussion of this area see
Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 35 Sw. L.J. 191, 194
(1981).
28. 616 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarakana 1981, no writ).
29. Id. at 362. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.204(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968)
provides that "[e]ven though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail
for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."
30. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 522If (Vernon Supp. 1982).
31. Id. §§ 20(a), (b).
32. Id. § 20(b).
33. Id. § 20(c)(4).
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1981.34 An attorney who represents sellers of manufactured homes should
be careful to advise the sellers to use the most recent form of notice pre-
scribed by the department because a defective notice is "evidence of wan-
34. Tex. Dept. of Labor & Standards, Reg. 063.55.09.004, 6 Tex. Reg. 3837 (1981)
provides:
The caption or heading of the notice shall be in all capital letters in at least 20-
point size type. The body of the notice shall be in all capital letters in at least
10-point size type. The other portions of the form shall be in type which is
eight points in size. The notice shall read as follows:
NOTICE TO PROSPECTIVE PURCHASERS OF
MANUFACTURED HOMES
WARNING
THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND STANDARDS IS CON-
DUCTING RESEARCH ON FORMALDEHYDE VAPORS AND IN-
DOOR AIR QUALITY. BUILDING PRODUCTS OR MATERIALS
NORMALLY USED IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF RESIDENTIAL
DWELLINGS MAY RELEASE AIRBORNE CONTAMINANTS OR
FORMALDEHYDE VAPORS INTO YOUR HOME.
STRINGENT CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS SET BY THE GOVERN-
MENT TO CONSERVE ENERGY HAVE LED TO CONCERN OVER
RESULTING INDOOR AIR QUALITY. WITH REDUCED AIR INFIL-
TRATION AND AIR EXCHANGE RATES, AIRBORNE VAPORS OR
CONTAMINANTS TEND TO ACCUMULATE IN THE HOME. THESE
VAPORS OR CONTAMINANTS APPEAR TO BE GENERATED BY
EMISSIONS FROM BUILDING PRODUCTS OR MATERIALS, SMOK-
ING, COOKING, FUEL BURNING APPLIANCES, CARELESS USE OF
SPRAYS OR CLEANING SOLUTIONS OR SEALANTS, EXCESS HU-
MIDITY, FURNISHINGS, CLOTHING, OR ACTIVITIES WHICH AL-
TER THE QUALITY OF THE INDOOR AIR. THERE ARE NO
GOVERNMENTAL STANDARDS OR REQUIREMENTS RELATING
TO THE EMISSION OF VAPORS OR CONTAMINANTS FROM RESI-
DENTIAL BUILDING PRODUCTS OR MATERIALS.
THESE FACTORS (SINGLY OR TOGETHER) MAY, OR MAY NOT,
CAUSE OR CONTRIBUTE TO DISCOMFORT, IRRITATION, SYMP-
TOMS, OR HEALTH PROBLEMS. ADEQUATE VENTILATION OF
YOUR HOME SHOULD HELP REDUCE THE LEVEL OF VAPORS OR
CONTAMINANTS IN THE INDOOR AIR; THEREFORE, PERIODIC
AIRING OF YOUR HOME IS ADVISED. PERSONS WITH ALLER-
GIES, ASTHMA, OR SENSITIVITIES MUST TAKE SPECIAL CARE TO
CONTROL THEIR INDOOR ENVIRONMENTS.
THIS NOTICE, REQUIRED BY TEXAS LAW AND REGULATION,
MAY BE REVISED OR DISCONTINUED BASED ON FINDINGS
FROM THIS RESEARCH. IF YOU HAVE HEALTH CONCERNS OR
PROBLEMS, CONSULT YOUR DOCTOR. IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS
ON INDOOR AIR QUALITY OR THIS NOTICE, CONTACT THE
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND STANDARDS:
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF LABOR DATE
AND STANDARDS I (WE) CERTIFY THAT
P.O. BOX 12157 THIS WARNING WAS
CAPITOL STATION GIVEN TO ME (US) ON THE
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711-2157 DATE SHOWN AND PRIOR
TELEPHONE: (512) 475-5712 TO THE SIGNING OF ANY
BINDING AGREEMENT TO
PURCHASE THE HOME
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ton disregard for the health and safety of the consumer. 35
B. Performance of Sales Contracts
Risk of Loss Before Delivery of Goods. In the absence of agreement to the
contrary, the risk of loss does not pass to a buyer of goods until they are
delivered or otherwise come into the buyer's control (as in F.O.B. ship-
ment contracts). 36 The Amarillo court of civil appeals in McClellan v.
Scardello Ford, Inc. held that the seller of a truck continued to have the
risk of loss until delivery under the provisions of the Code. 37 The trial
court's holding that the buyer was liable to the seller for the purchase price
of the truck that was destroyed by fire prior to delivery was therefore
reversed.38
Bona Fide Purchasers and Certficates of Title. In Drake Insurance Co. v.
King39 the Texas Supreme Court held that the purchaser of a stolen truck
who failed to demand that his seller comply with the Texas Certificate of
Title Act40 could not qualify as a bona fide purchaser to acquire a title
superior to that of the true out-of-state owner.4' Although the court did
not discuss the effect of its holding on the various good faith purchase
provisions in the Code,42 it emphasized the buyer's duty to ensure compli-
ance with the Certificate of Title Act 43 before purchasing a motor vehi-
(type name of retailer)
(type retailer address)
(city, state, zip)






(type name(s) of purchaser(s))
(type plant location) (purchaser's address)
(type identification number(s) (city, state, zip)
of home)
35. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221f, § 20(d) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981).
This proviso would bear on the warranties created by TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§ 2.314, .315 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968), as well as on suits based on common law negli-
gence and strict liability theories. The statute specifically states, however, that its provisions
"shall not be deemed to imply or infer that the retailer or manufacturer had, or did not have,
prior to the passage of this Act any duty to warn any consumer concerning the possible
effects of formaldehyde." TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221f, § 20(d) (Vernon Pam.
Supp. 1971-1981).
36. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.509(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
37. 619 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ).
38. Id. at 597.
39. 606 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1980).
40. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6687-1, §§ 51, 53 (Vernon 1977).
41. 606 S.W.2d at 817.
42. The most important of the good faith purchase provisions in the Code are TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.403 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968), 9.307 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp.
1982).
43. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6687-1 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1982).
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cle, 44 leaving little doubt that a good faith purchase under the Code
includes a duty to follow the requirements of the certificate of title
legislation.45
C.IF Contracts. The Fifth Circuit in Steuber Co. v. Hercules, Inc. 46 con-
fronted whether a C.I.F. destination contract required the seller or the
buyer to be responsible for the off-loading of goods upon arrival at the
port of destination. The court held that under the Code, a C.I.F. destina-
tion contract required a buyer to pay for the goods upon tender of the
documents unless the parties agreed otherwise. After tender, the buyer
had the duty to secure the unloading of the goods.47 A fact issue remained
as to whether there was an "agreement otherwise," and the case therefore
was remanded to the trial court for determination of that issue.48
C. Warranties
Implied Warranties. In Clark v. DeLaval Separator Corp. 49 the Fifth Cir-
cuit addressed a question of first impression under the Texas Commercial
Code.50 The novel issue was whether an implied warranty of
merchantability explicitly extended to the future performance of goods.51
The court, finding no Texas cases on the point, reviewed case law in other
jurisdictions and held that, by its very nature, "an implied warranty cannot
exphcitly extend to future performance."52 Judgment was rendered for the
seller.s3 The decision seems eminently sound because an implied war-
ranty, as an obligation imposed by law, is not a contract term explicitly
stated by the contracting parties in their agreement.
44. 606 S.W.2d at 817. The court cited numerous cases, most of which were pre-Code,
that support a good faith rule, including: Texas Automotive Dealers Ass'n v. Hams County
Tax Assessor-Collector, 149 Tex. 122, 229 S.W.2d 787 (1950); Boswell v. Connell, 556
S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Mossier Acceptance Co. v.
Burke, 252 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App.--Galveston 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Deahl v.
Thomas, 224 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1949, writ refed n.r.e.); Ball v. Soren-
son, 191 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ, App.-Fort Worth 1945, no writ).
45. An interesting question that arises from the holding in Drake is whether the conflict
of law rules in TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.103(b)(2), (4) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp.
1982) will operate to protect a Texas buyer or secured party against an out-of-state
lienholder, as contrasted to an owner, after the expiration of the four-month period of
perfection there specified. While the decision in Drake seems to be correct on its own facts,
the case raises a question because of the possible breadth of its holding.
46. 646 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1981).
47. Id. at 1097; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.320, 2.504 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1968).
48. 646 F.2d at 1099.
49. 639 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1981).
50. The court also addressed questions of disclaimers and evidence. Id. at 1324-26.
51. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) provides that
the cause of action for breach of any contract accrues when the breach occurs, and a breach
of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made. An exception exists, however, when the
warranty explicitly extends to the future performance of the goods, that allows for accrual of
the cause of action at the time of actual or constructive discovery of the breach.
52. 639 F.2d at 1325 (emphasis in original).
53. Id. at 1327.
1982]
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Chrysler Corp. v. Roberson ,4 an implied warranty case before the Waco
court of civil appeals, involved a number of procedural issues, in particular
several special issues concerning warranty and deceptive trade practices
were raised. In a lengthy opinion, the court addressed each of the chal-
lenges made by the defendants and concluded that the judgment of the
trial court should stand.55 The case is worth studying on special issue sub-
missio,, .. warranty actions because of the careful and comprehensive dis-
cussion by tb court.5 6
Implied Warranties in the Sale of Used Goods. In two cases Texas courts of
civil appeals held that there was no implied warranty in the sale of used
goods in Texas.5 7 Both cases involved the additional question of whether
an implied warranty would extend not simply to used goods, but to used
houses. In each case the court answered this question in the negative.58
Neither case considered whether Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry




Statute of Limitations in Sales Cases. A new and rather intriguing issue
has been raised following the case of Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc. ,61
decided by the Texas Supreme Court. Garcia involved two issues: (1)
whether an implied warranty action for personal injuries would lie without
privity between the seller and the injured party, and (2) whether such an
action would be within the two-year tort statute of limitations62 or within
the four-year sales statute of limitations. 63 The court held that privity was
not required, and that the four-year statute would govern. 4
The question remaining after Garcia is whether the statute of limitations
begins to run upon tender of delivery, the Code standard, or whether the
statute begins to run upon occurrence of the injury. The issue arises in
part from Garcia and in part from the interpretation placed upon that deci-
54. 619 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ).
55. Id. at 462.
56. Id. at 458-59. The court held a complaint was not preserved for appeal after an
original complaint was acted on by the court and no additional or subsequent complaint was
articulated. Id.
57. Thornton Homes, Inc. v. Greiner, 619 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981,
no writ); Cheney v. Parks, 605 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980,
writ rePd n.r.e.).
58. 619 S.W.2d at 9; 605 S.W.2d at 642.
59. 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978) (discussion of effect of use of term "as is" in contract for
sale of used aircraft implying existence of implied warranty in sale of used goods).60. This question is discussed in some detail in Krahmer, upra note 27, at 198-99. The
Mid Continent issue is one that should be clarified in the used goods cases.
61. 610 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1980). For a discussion, see Krahmer, supra note 27, at 196-
97.
62. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5526(4) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
63. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
64. 610 S.W.2d at 465.
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sion in Cleveland v. Square-D Co. ,65 a subsequent court of civil appeals
case. In Garcia the court noted early in the opinion that the injuries oc-
curred approximately three years and eight months before suit was
brought, 66 but the court also noted that the sale had occurred over a period
of time ranging from four years and two months to three years and eight
months before the suit was filed.6 7 At the very end of its opinion, however,
the court shifted ground and said that the implied warranty action had
been "filed approximately three years and eight months after the sale of
the sulfuric acid."' 68 The lack of clarity in Garcia as to the event that trig-
gered the running of the four-year limitation period, the tender of delivery
or the time of injury, led the court of civil appeals in Cleveland to hold that
the four-year statute of limitations applied to a personal injury case
brought on a warranty theory. There was no discussion in the opinion of
the date when the sale occurred, and apparently the court assumed that the
date of injury controlled.69 Based on Garcia and its progeny, a serious
question exists as to when the four-year sales statute of limitations begins
to run in personal injury warranty cases.
III. COMMERCIAL PAPER
(CHAPTER 3)
A. Form of Negotiable Instruments
The Requirement of an Unconditional Promise. In Mitchell v. Riverside Na-
tionalBank70 the court of civil appeals held that a statement contained in a
note that said the note was "subject to and governed by" the terms of an
extrinsic contract created a condition on the promise to pay, and rendered
the note non-negotiable. 71 In support of the conclusion, the court cited a
1928 civil appeals decision,72 and never referred to section 3.105 of the
Code,73 that clearly would have led to the same result.
B. Enforcement of Commercial Paper
Rights of a Holder in Due Course. Under the Code, when the signatures on
an instrument are admitted or established, production of the instrument
entitles a holder to recover provided a defense is not established. 74 If a
65. 613 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
66. 610 S.W.2d at 457.
67. Id. (emphasis added). Deliveries began on Aug. 16, 1974; suit, however, was not
begun until Oct. 18, 1978.
68. Id. at 465.
69. 613 S.W.2d 790, 791-92 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
70. 613 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref d n.r.e.).
71. Id. at 803.
72. American Exch. Nat'l Bank v. Steeley, 10 S.W.2d 1038 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1928, writ refed). (Reference to an extrinsic contract in trade acceptances did not make the
instruments non-negotiable).
73. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.105(b)(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). The provi-
sion states that "[a] promise or order is not unconditional if the instrument ... states that it
is subject or governed by any other agreement."
74. Id. § 3.307(b) provides that "when signatures are admitted or established, produc-
1982]
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defense is shown to exist, the holder is then required to prove that all of the
requirements for holding "in due course" have been met.75 In Favors v.
Yaffe76 the Houston court of civil appeals properly considered and applied
these Code rules to decide that the maker of a note had not effectively
rebutted the holder's evidence of holding in due course, and that, there-
fore, the defense of fraud was ineffective. 77 The case is a brief, but good,
analysis of the holder in due course rules set forth in chapter 3 of the Code.
Rights of One Not a Holder in Due Course and the Jus Tertii. The case of
Landscape Design & Construction, Inc. v. Warren78 was discussed in the
last Annual Survey.79 In that case the court held: (1) that a maker or
drawer could not raise the jus tertii defense of a failure of consideration
between a payee and the payee's immediate indorsee, and (2) that a payee
was absolutely liable to an indorsee on the payee's contract of indorse-
ment, whether or not the payee received consideration.80 The first holding
in Landscape Design was correct, the second, however, was simply wrong.
The court in Landscape Design cited only pre-Code cases as its authority,
and misinterpreted those.8' Fortunately, a case reported during this survey
period utilized proper Code analysis in addressing the same issues. In Da-
vis v. Watson Bros. Plumbing, Inc. the Dallas court of civil appeals held
that, under the Code, a maker or drawer could not raise the jus tertii de-
fense of failure of consideration in situations paralleling those discussed in
Landscape Design.82 This portion of the opinion simply puts the jus tertii
analysis on a Code ground. In resolving the second issue, the Dallas court
discussed the right of the payee to raise a defense of failure of considera-
tion under sections 3.306(3) and 3.408 of the Code. 83 The Davis case is on
solid ground and should help to correct the erroneous second portion of
the Landscape Design decision.84
C Liability of Parties
Liability of Parties Signing in a Representative Capacity. Womack v. First
tion of the instrument entitles a holder to recover on it unless the defendant establishes a
defense."
75. Id. § 3.307(c).
76. 605 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
77. Id. at 345.
78. 598 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
79. Krahmer, supra note 27, at 208-10.
80. 598 S.W.2d 4t 40.
81. Culberson v. Hawkins, 321 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, no writ).
See Krahmer, supra note 27, at 209-10. The Landscape court held the payee was liable
regardless of the payment of consideration while § 3.306 provides the payee with a defense
upon failure of payment of consideration. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.306 (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968).
82. 615 S.W.2d 844, 846-47 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
83. Id. at 846; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.306(3), 3.408 (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968).
84. For a discussion about the erroneous second portion of the opinion, see Krahmer,
supra note 27, at 209-10.
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National Bank 5 is the latest in the long series of Texas cases dealing with
the liability of parties who sign instruments in a representative capacity. 86
Womak adds to this body of law the point that, absent ratification or es-
toppel, no person is liable for an instrument without a valid signature
thereon.8
7
Liability of Indorser on Dishonored Check. Many commercial paper cases
can be decided by a summary judgment if the instrument and supporting
documents are in order. A good example of this principle is Barham v.
Sugar Creek National Bank,8  in which the collecting bank as holder of a
check, upon learning that payment had been stopped and the check dis-
honored, gave prompt notice of dishonor to its indorser. In an action to
recover the amount due on the indorsement contract, the bank moved for
summary judgment after having introduced the check and an affidavit by
the bank's vice president and cashier describing the actions taken upon
dishonor. Because the indorsement also constituted a contract debt that
was unpaid for more than thirty days, the bank sought recovery for attor-
ney's fees as part of its case under article 2226 of the Texas statutes. 89
85. 613 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, writ filed).
86. See, e.g., Griffin v. Ellinger, 538 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. 1976) (president of corporation
held personally liable); Scale v. Nichols, 505 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. 1974) (signor of promissory
note who did not reveal his representative capacity held personally liable); Wolf v. Little
John Corp. of Liberia, 585 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1979, writ refd
n.r.e.) (court refused to disregard the corporate form to hold shareholders and officers lia-
ble); Walker v. Republic Nat 1 Bank, 559 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ)
(defendant mistakenly signed note in individual capacity).
87. 613 S.W.2d at 552. The relevant Code sections are TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§ 3.401, .404(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
88. 612 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
89. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1982) provides:
Any person, corporation, partnership, or other legal entity having a valid
claim against a person or corporation for services rendered, labor done, mate-
rial furnished, overcharges on freight or express, lost or damaged freight or
express, or stock killed or injured, or suits founded upon a sworn account or
accounts, or suits founded on oral or written contracts, may present the same
to such persons or corporation or to any duly authorized agent thereof; and if,
at the expiration of 30 days thereafter, payment for the just amount owing has
not been tendered, the claimant may, if represented by an attorney, also re-
cover, in addition to his claim an costs, a reasonable amount as attorney's fees.
The usual and customary fees in such cases shall be presumed to be reason-
able, but such presumption may be rebutted by competent evidence. In a pro-
ceeding before the court, or in a jury case where the issue of amount of
attorney's fees is submitted to the court for determination by agreement, the
court may in its discretion take judicial knowledge of the usual and customary
fees in such matters and of the contents of the case file without receiving fur-
ther evidence. The provisions hereof shall not apply to contracts of insurers
issued by insurers subject to the provisions of the Unfair Claim Settlement
Practices Act (Article 21.21-2, Insurance Code), nor shall it apply to con-
tracts of any insurer subject to the provisions of Article 3.62, Insurance Code,
or to Chapter 387, Acts of the 55th Legislature, Regular Session, 1957, as
amended (Article 3.62-1, Vernon's Texas Insurance Code), or to Article
21.21, Insurance Code, as amended, or to Chapter 9, Insurance Code, as
amended, and each such article or chapter shall be and remain in full force
and effect. This Act shall be liberally construed to promote its underlying
purposes.
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Summary judgment was granted, and the recovery of attorney's fees was
allowed, and both were affirmed on appeal.90 Barham is a model of well-
handled commercial litigation.91
Warranty Liability or Commercial Paper. Under chapter 3 every indorser
makes two distinct representations to subsequent holders.The first repre-
sentation under a contract of indorsement is that the indorser will pay the
instrument if it is dishonored, provided that the conditions precedent, pre-
sentment, dishonor, and notice of dishonor, are fulfilled.92 The second
representation goes to the quality of the instrument, and amounts to a war-
ranty that the instrument and its prior transfer(s) are valid.93 As is true in
the sale of goods, the warranty is breached upon transfer.94 When it exists,
warranty liability is more absolute than the contract of indorsement liabil-
ity because no presentment, dishonor, or notice of dishonor is required to
bring an action for the breach of warranty.95 The stricter nature of war-
ranty liability is also apparent by noting the difference a "without re-
course" indorsement has on contract liability as contrasted to warranty
liability. A "without recourse" indorsement completely disclaims the con-
tract of indorsement liability,96 but only slightly limits the scope of the
warranty obligation.97
This difference in the theoretical underpinnings of contract liability and
warranty liability was recognized by the court in Vandergrf Chevrolet Co.
90. 612 S.W.2d at 80-81.
91. By way of contrast, see New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Bank of the Southwest, 584
S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ) discussed in Krahmer, Commercial
Transactions, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 199, 215-16 (1980).
92. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.414(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). The condi-
tions precedent to enforcement of a contract of indorsement are set out in id. § 3.501.
93. Id. § 3.417(b) provides:
Any person who transfers an instrument and receives consideration war-
rants to his transferee and if the transfer is by indorsement to any subsequent
holder who takes the instrument in good faith that
(1) he has a good title to the instrument or is authorized to obtain payment
or acceptance on behalf of one who has a good title and the transfer is
otherwise rightful; and
(2) all signatures are genuine or authorized; and
(3) the instrument has not been materially altered; and
(4) no defense of any party is good against him; and
(5) he has no knowledge of any insolvency proceeding instituted with re-
spect to the maker or accepter or the drawer of an unaccepted
instrument.
The warranty also extends to collecting banks. Id. § 4.207(b).
94. Id. § 2.725(b) provides that "[a] breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery
is made." This provision is applicable to an indorsement contract because id. § 3.417, com-
ment 1, states that "[t]he obligations imposed by this section are stated in terms of warranty.
Warranty terms, which are not limited to sale transactions, are used with the intention of
bringing in all the usual rules of law applicable to warranties ....
95. Indorsement liability is hedged with fairly technical conditions precedent while
warranty liability has almost no procedural impediments to enforcement. Compare id.
§ 3.414(a) with id. §§ 3.417(b), 4.207(b). Section 3.414(a) requires dishonor, notice of dis-
honor, and protest. Language to that effect is absent from § 3.417 and § 4.207(b).
96. Id. § 3.414(a).
97. Id. § 3.417(c).
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v. Forum Bank.98 A retail installment contract was assigned by a car
dealer to a bank under a "without recourse" assignment. The court ap-
plied an approach similar to that under chapter 3 in the pure negotiable
instrument cases to the assignment of the retail installment contracts. The
assignment agreement contained a statement of warranties that were made
"regardless of the form of the assignment." 99 The court therefore held that
while the "without recourse" assignment would effectively disclaim the
contractual liability, it would not affect the warranty liability of the as-
signor.I°° Damages were allowed for a warranty breach as a permissible
alternative remedy to the repurchase obligation stated in the assignment
agreement. The court stated that there was no indication that repurchas-
ing should be the exclusive remedy.
Waiver of Right to Accelerate. While chapter 3 generally permits the inclu-
sion of an acceleration clause in an instrument,' 0 the right of acceleration
must be exercised in good faith.'0 2 In McGowan v. Pasol the court held
that an attempt by a holder to accelerate a debt was improperly made be-
cause the note was not in default. 10 3 The court stated that, alternatively,
there was evidence to support the view that the holder had accepted late
payments in the past and was merely seeking to coerce the maker into
paying the full balance under risk of foreclosure. 1' 4
D. Discharge of Liability
Discharge by Estoppel Under the negotiable instruments law, only an in-
strument could be discharged.105 Under the Code, however, a party is
discharged' 6 and the right to assert the discharge is treated as a personal
defense.' 0 7 Section 3.601 contains a listing of the several ways in which the
discharge of a party may occur,10 8 and includes a general catch-all state-
ment that "[a]ny party is also discharged from his liability on an instru-
ment to another party by any other act or agreement with such party which
would discharge his simple contract for the payment of money."' 9
During the survey period, the Houston [14th District] court of civil ap-
peals decided Airline Commercial Bank v. Wilburn. 110 The court held that
a party could be discharged from liability on an instrument by the equita-
ble estoppel of a holder who had knowingly made misrepresentations of
98. 613 S.W.2d 68 (lex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
99. Id. at 69.
100. Id. at 71.
101. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.109(a)(3) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
102. Id. § 1.208.
103. 605 S.W.2d 728, 731-32 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ).
104. Id. at 732.
105. UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT LAW § 200 (The UCC was approved in 1952,
replacing the UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT LAW).
106. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.601 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
107. Id. §§ 3.305, .306, .601.
108. Id. § 3.601(a).
109. Id. § 3.601(b).
110. 609 S.W.2d 813 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).
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fact that were relied on to the detriment of the maker. I"' Although section
3.601 was not cited by the court, the decision is consistent with the quoted
provisions of that section. 112
FD.I C. Charge-Off Does Not Discharge Liability. In FD.I C v. Man-
ning 113 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (F.D.I.C.) had charged
off part of an unpaid note as an unbankable asset in the liquidation of the
Northeast Bank. 14 Subsequently, the F.D.I.C. sued the maker for the full
balance due on the note. The maker defended on the ground that the
charge-off amounted to a discharge.1 5 On appeal the court considered the
provisions of section 3.601 and concluded that the charge-off was merely a
bank examiner's bookkeeping entry in the liquidation process and was not
intended as a discharge.1 6 Although not cited, section 3.605117 seems to
support the court's position by requiring that a discharge by the holder be




A. Bank Contractual Obligations to Non-Customers
No Liability to Holder of Check. In Happy Cattle Feeders, Inc. v. First Na-
tional Bank" 8 the court properly held that a check did not operate as an
assignment of the funds in a drawer's account and that a bank had no
direct liability to the holder of a check drawn against those funds.' '9 The
bank was entitled to pay other checks drawn on the same account and
could choose which of the several checks to pay and which to dishonor. 120
Bank Liable on Promise to Trans/er Funds. In Harwood & Associates, Inc.
v. Texas Bank & Tust12 1 a bank was held liable on its promise to transfer
funds from the payee's account to the plaintiff in exchange for the plain-
tif's sending a telegram requesting the cancellation of a stop payment or-
der issued by a third party.' 22 This result is consistent with the provisions
111. Id. at 815.
112. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.601 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
113. 608 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).
114. ld. at 271.
115. Id. at 271-72.
116. Id. at 271.
117. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.605 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
118. 618 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ).
119. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.409(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968), which
provides: "A check or other draft does not of itself operate as an assignment of any funds in
the hands of the drawee available for its payment, and the drawee is not liable on the instru-
ment until he accepts it."
120. 618 S.W.2d at 427. Although not cited by the court, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 4.303(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) would have given additional support to the decision.
Section 4.303(b) provides that items may be accepted, paid, certified or charged to the indi-
cated account of its customer in any order convenient to the bank.
121. 654 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1981).
122. Id. at 1078.
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of section 3.409(b) and section 1.103 of the Code. 123
B. Bank Obligations to Customers
Liability for Wrongful Dishonor. Two interesting wrongful dishonor cases
were reported during the survey period. 124 In Farmers & Merchants State
Bank v. Ferguson 125 the Texas Supreme Court held that a business cus-
tomer of a bank could not qualify for treble damage recovery under the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act126 because the definition of "services" in
existence at the time the facts of the case arose excluded services acquired
for commercial or business use. 127 The customerwas entitled, however, to
recovery damages under section 4.402 of the Code 128 for loss of credit, loss
of time, loss of funds and the use of funds, and for mental anguish. The
damages for mental anguish were allowed because unrebutted evidence
was found sufficient to support the jury's finding of malice in the dishonor
of some checks. 129
The second case was Elizarraras v. Bank ofE! Paso 130 in which the Fifth
Circuit confronted a wrongful dishonor issue not previously addressed by
the Texas courts under a Code analysis. The basic issue was whether the
so-called "trader rule"'131 was still applicable under the Code in cases of
intentional or reckless dishonor. 132 The Code had clearly eliminated the
"trader rule" in cases of mistaken dishonor. 133 In a carefully researched
opinion, the court concluded that the trader rule still existed in cases of
intentional or reckless dishonor, but that the plaintiff should be required to
show such matters as the volume of business, prior revenue, the required
123. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 3.409(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) provides that
"[niothing in this section shall affect any liability in contract, tort or otherwise arising from
any letter of credit or other obligation or representation which is not an acceptance." Id.
§ 1.103 provides that "[ulnless displaced by the particular provisions of this title, the princi-
ples of law and equity ... shall supplement its provisions."
124. Elizarraras v. Bank of El Paso, 631 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1980); Farmers & Merchants
State Bank v. Ferguson, 617 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1981).
125. 617 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1981).
126. The plaintiff attempted to come under the DTPA as a "consumer," which was de-
fined at that time as "an individual, partnership, or corporation who seeks or acquires by
purchase or lease, any goods or services." 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 62, § 1(4), at 149. "Serv-
ices" were defined at that time as "work, labor, or service purchased or leased for use, for
other than commercial or business use, including services furnished in connection with the
sale or repair of goods." Id. § 1(2), at 149. The definition was broadened in 1977 and now
include services acquired for commercial or business use. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
17.45(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982). The treble damages recovery has, however, been deleted. Id.
§ 17.50.
127. 617 S.W.2d at 920-21.
128. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.402 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
129. 617 S.W.2d at 921.
130. 631 F.2d at 366 (5th Cir. 1980).
131. At common law the "trader rule" permitted the recovery of substantial damages for
loss of reputation and loss of credit by those engaged in business without the need to prove
actual damages. Damages in the case of a business were, in effect, presumed. See, e.g., First
Nat'l Bank v. N.R. McFall & Co., 144 Ark. 149, 222 S.W. 40 (1920). See generall,, Annot.,
126 A.L.R. 206, 220-25 (1940).
132. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.402 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
133. Id., comment 3.
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use of credit by the business, and the prospects for future income to reduce
speculation by the jury on the amount of damage. 134 The case was re-
manded for a new trial on the damage issue.' 35 Note that Elizarraras is a
federal case seeking to determine and apply Texas law in an area where
the Texas courts have not yet spoken. Whether the federal court was cor-
rect in its reasoning is a matter still to be determined by the state courts.
C Right of Set- Off
The Texas Equitable Set- Off Rule. In Continental National Bank v. Great
American Management & Investment, Inc. 136 the Texas court of civil ap-
peals applied the "equitable" set-off rule 137 to deny a bank the right to set
off a debt against the account of a depositor. The case contains a state-
ment of the equitable set-off rule that is remarkable for its clarity and de-
serves full quotation for the benefit of lawyers who deal with set-off
problems:
When a bank which has no knowledge or notice that funds on deposit
in an account of one with the bank are held as fiduciary it has the
right to apply the funds on deposit against the depositor's individual
indebtedness and to retain them until it is established that they were
in fact held in the account by the depositor in a fiduciary capacity for
another; and, even should the fact subsequently be proved, yet may
have the right to retain them if, by reason of the lack of notice and
because of justified reliance upon the depositor's apparent ownership,
the bank has changed its position to its injury. Conversely, the bank
has not the right to seize and so apply the funds where it (a) does
have such knowledge, or (b) by reason of the circumstances is "on
notice" thereof or, (c) by reason of known circumstances, is charged
with the duty of making the inquiry which, if made, would disclose
the fact that the funds were held by the depositor as a fiduciary; and
furthermore even where innocently seized, the funds must be yielded up
to the equitable owner when the entrustment fact is established unless
he who is in possession can and does show that he has changed his
position to his injury [upon or after the seizure] so that it would be
inequitable to require him to yield up the funds. 138
Under this rule, funds held in trust accounts, custodial accounts and,
quite importantly, secured transaction proceeds accounts, are immune
from set-off when the bank is on notice of their character. This much of
the rule is standard set-off law.139 The other portion of the equitable rule
requiring a detrimental change of position by the bank upon or after
134. 631 F.2d at 376-77.
135. Id. at 377.
136. 606 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ refed n.r.e.).
137. The "equitable" set-off rule, sometimes called the "federal rule," was adopted by
the Texas Supreme Court in National Indem. Co. v. Spring Branch State Bank, 162 Tex.
521, 348 S.W.2d 528 (1961).
138. 606 S.W.2d at 348 (emphasis in original).
139. First Nat'l Bank v. Winkler, 146 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1940), aft'd,
139 Tex. 131, 161 S.W.2d 1053 (1942); Dockstader v. Brown, 204 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1947, writ refd n.r.e.). See Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 235, 239 (1966).
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seizure is, however, less widely adopted.' 4° The change of position re-
quirement may be of particular interest to secured parties seeking to assert
a claim to the proceeds in a bank account in competition with a bank's
asserted right of set-off to the same funds.' 4' To the best of the author's
knowledge, the requirement of change of position has not been adjudi-
cated in Texas under the Code.
D. Letters of Credit
Letter of Credit to Pay Telephone Charges. In Cypress Bank v. Southwest-
ern Bell Telephone Co. 142 a bank had issued a standby letter of credit with
a one-year term to guarantee payment of telephone charges incurred by its
customer. Because the telephone company failed to present the required
drafts and documents until after the one-year expiration date had passed,
the issuing bank was held not liable under the terms of the credit.' 43
V. BULK TRANSFERS
(CHAPTER 6)
A. Burden of Proof
Creditor Required to Prove Availability of Assets After Transfer. In Ander-
son & Clayton Co. v. Earnest'" a creditor sought to obtain judgment
against the transferee of a feed store business for the amount of an unpaid
debt incurred by the previous owner of the business. The creditor success-
fully proved noncompliance with the bulk transfer provisions of the
Code, 45 and proved the amount of the unpaid debt. No evidence was
introduced to show the value of assets sold by the transferee or the value of
assets still on hand. Because of the failure of proof on the value issues, the
creditor was entitled neither to a personal judgment against the transferee
nor to a judgment authorizing a levy against the assets.' 46
140. Colorado, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, and Wisconsin, in addition to Texas, are adherents of the
equitable rule. See Cox v. Metropolitan State Bank, Inc., 138 Colo. 576, 336 P.2d 742
(1959); Peoples State Bank v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 213 Ind. 235, 12 N.E.2d 123 (1938);
Burtnett v. First Nat'l Bank, 38 Mich. 630 (1878); Berg v. Union State Bank, 186 Minn. 529,
243 N.W. 696 (1932); Allen Dudley & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 122 Neb. 443, 240 N.W. 522
(1932); Brady v. American Nat'l Bank, 120 Okla. 159, 250 P. 1006 (1926); Sherts v. Fulton
Nat'l Bank, 342 Pa. 337, 21 A.2d 18 (1941); Peurifoy v. Boswell, 162 S.C. 107, 160 S.E. 156
(1931); Thompson v. Commercial & Say. Bank, 50 S.D. 154, 208 N.W. 280 (1926); Commer-
cial Discount Corp. v. Milwaukee W. Bank, 61 Wis. 2d 671, 214 N.W.2d 33 (1974).
141. Commercial Discount Corp. v. Milwaukee W. Bank, 61 Wis. 2d 671, 214 N.W.2d
33, 39-40 (1974).
142. 610 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In an
earlier Survey article, the author speculated that the use of standby letters of credit might be
increasing. Krahmer, supra note 91, at 199 n.3. That speculation seems to receive some
support when standby credits are used to guarantee payment of telephone bills as in this
case. 610 S.W.2d at 186.
143. 610 S.W.2d at 187.
144. 610 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ).
145. Id. at 848; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 6.101-.1ll (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1968).





A. Contractsfor Sale of Securities
Compliance with Chapter 8 Statute of Frauds. The Corpus Christi court of
appeals dealt with several interesting issues under chapter 8 of the Code in
Kenny v. Porter.'47 The first issue was whether the stock of a closely held
corporation was a "security" under section 8.102,148 the definitional sec-
tion of chapter 8. The court concluded that the definition of "security"
was broad enough to encompass such stock.149
The second issue was whether the statute of frauds provision in section
8.319150 had been satisfied. The court found that the statutory require-
ments had not been met because no written agreement had been signed,
and no admission had been made in court that the alleged oral contract
existed.' 5 The court then confronted whether the doctrine of promissory
estoppel could be used to avoid the operation of the' statute of frauds.
While the court agreed that promissory estoppel could be used in the man-
ner urged, the plaintiff failed to show that any representation had been
made that a written agreement would be signed in the future.152 The judg-
ment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. 153
VII. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
(CHAPTER 9)
A. Applicability of the Code
Common Law Pledge of Deposit Account. Although chapter 9 of the Code
covers most of the secured transactions area, certain cases are excluded by
section 9.104.'54 These interstitial cases are governed by other law, includ-
ing common law pledge. In a bankruptcy case' 55 reported during the sur-
vey period, a printing company had assigned a savings account to the
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts as security for the payment of sales
taxes. The printing company later filed a bankruptcy reorganization plan
under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 156 As a debtor in possession,1 57
the company challenged the security interest of the comptroller on the
147. 604 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
148. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.102 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
149. 604 S.W.2d at 302.
150. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.319 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
151. 604 S.W.2d at 302-03.
152. Id. at 303-05.
153. Id. at 306.
154. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.104(l)-(12) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
Most of the excluded cases deal with transactions that (1) are preempted by federal law, (2)
are nonconsensual liens, or (3) involve collateral of a special nature where public policy is a
consideration. Id.
155. In re Tigert Printing Co., 648 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1981).
156. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1501 (Supp. III 1979).
157. Under the Bankruptcy Code a debtor in possession has the rights and powers of a




ground that the interest in the savings account was not properly perfected
by recording under the terms of the Texas taxation statutes. 58
The court noted that the transfer of an interest in a deposit account was
specifically excluded from the coverage of chapter 9, thereby making the
validity of the comptroller's interest turn on application of common law
pledge requirements. 59 Upon consideration of the common law of pledge,
the court concluded that possession of the collateral was an essential ele-
ment for creation and perfection of a security interest. l 0 The court held
that the comptroller had gained sufficient possession of the savings account
by the notice to the bank of the assignment to constitute a valid pledge.' 6 1
The court further held that the Texas taxation statutes were not applicable
to common law pledge arrangements because possession served the same
function as recordation of a tax lien, and gave notice of the comptroller's
claim. 16
2
B. Validity of Securiy Agreement
Clauses allowing Acceleration and Repossession. In Woolard v. Texas Mo-
tors, Inc. 163 a poor drafting job was saved from invalidity by the court's
generosity in its interpretation. The security agreement contained an ac-
celeration clause that did not exclude unearned interest from acceleration,
creating a situation that might have led to a claim for the payment of usu-
rious interest. The court held that, while the clause was susceptible to an
interpretation that would violate the usury statutes, the contract as a whole
did not show an intent to charge or collect usurious interest, and the clause
should be interpreted as intended to comply with the law. 64
Another clause in the agreement provided that the "seller shall have the
right to repossess the property wherever the same may be found with free
right of entry."' 65 The buyer contended that this clause authorized the
seller to unlawfully enter the buyer's premises to effect repossession, or to
commit a breach of the peace in repossessing the collateral, thereby violat-
ing article 5069-7.07(3) of the Texas Consumer Credit Code. 16  The
court held that the clause was intended as a limitation on the right of re-
possession; repossession is allowed only when the collateral is located in a
158. TEx. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 1.07(1)(c) (Vernon 1969).
159. 648 F.2d at 365-66. The court accepted the characterization of the transaction as a
common law pledge by the parties without expressing its view on the accuracy of this
characterization.
160. Id. at 367.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. 616 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
164. Id. at 708.
165. Id. at 709.
166. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.07(3) (Vernon 1977) provides that "[n]o
retail installment contract or retail charge agreement shall... [a]uthorize the seller or
holder or other person acting in his behalf to enter upon the buyer's premises unlawfully or
to commit any breach of the peace in the repossession of a motor vehicle." The Texas
Consumer Credit Code is not a true code since it has not been adopted as part of the Texas
codification legislation. It has, however, become generally known by that name.
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place where "free right of entry" is lawful. 167 The judgment for the seller
was affirmed.' 68
Clauses Allowing the Retention of Noncollateral Personalty. A major prob-
lem confronting secured parties who seek to repossess collateral, particu-
larly motor vehicles, is that the debtor may have attached other personalty
to the basic collateral,' 69 or may have left other property within the collat-
eral. Because the secured party runs the risk of conversion liability if the
noncollateral personalty is lost or otherwise unaccounted for,' 70 there is a
strong incentive to limit liability by the inclusion of appropriate terms in
the security agreement. A difficulty with this approach is that a secured
party may be tempted not only to limit liability, but to eliminate liability
altogether. A clause that goes too far may run afoul of the Texas Con-
sumer Credit Code.' 7' In a series of civil appeals cases, 172 culminating in
a Texas Supreme Court decision, 173 the Ford Motor Credit Company
learned that the following clause violates article 5069-7.07(4)174: "Any
personalty in or attached to the property when repossessed may be held by
Seller without liability and Buyer shall be deemed to have waived any
claim thereto unless written demand by certified mail is made upon Seller
within 24 hours after repossession."'' 75
Because of the number of cases reported in which the identical clause
was challenged, a fair inference is that this clause was a standard feature of
Ford Motor Credit contracts for some period of time. Given the lack of
success this clause has had in the courts, the courts apparently are unwill-
ing to accept such a complete limitation of liability for a creditor who re-
posses other property attached to or contained within the secured property.
C Perfection of Security Interests
Failure to File Proper Financing Statement. In Sommers v. International
Business Machines176 the court held that the failure to file a financing
statement or security agreement signed by the debtor 77 made a claimed
167. 616 S.W.2d at 709.
168. Id. at 710.
169. The attachment of other personalty to the basic collateral is technically termed an
"accession" under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.314 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
170. See, e.g., Southern Indus. Sav. Bank v. Greens, 224 So. 2d 416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969) (creditor liable for loss of valuables when sufficient evidence was presented to deter-
mine damages).
171. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.07(4) (Vernon 1961).
172. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Brown, 613 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi
1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Corley, 613 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1981, writ refd n.r.e.); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. McDaniel, 613 S.W.2d 513
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
173. Zapata v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 615 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. 1981).
174. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.07(d) (Vernon 1971).
175. 615 S.W.2d at 200. The same clause was the subject of litigation in the three cases
cited in note 172 supra.
176. 640 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1981).
177. The ch. 9 filing requirements are specified in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 9.402(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
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security interest unperfected, and subject to the avoiding powers of the
debtor's trustee in bankruptcy.' 78
Legislative Developments. Two state legislative amendments were enacted
during the 1981 session that bear upon the perfection of security inter-
ests. 179 The first amendment was the revision of the Manufactured Hous-
ing Standards Act to provide that after March 1, 1982, security interests in
manufactured homes held as inventory by a dealer are to be perfected by
filing a security agreement with the Texas Department of Labor and Stan-
dards.180 The agreement is to be in a form that contains any information
that may be required by the department.' 8 ' Lawyers should note that this
amendment will probably require the filing of a document other than the
short U.C.C.-I form.' 82 Filing of a U.C.C.-1 with the office of the secre-
tary of state, therefore, will no longer be effective to perfect a security in-
terest in manufactured home inventory. 83 By the same amendment, the
department of labor and standards was designated as the appropriate
agency to issue certificates of title on manufactured homes sold to purchas-
ers from a dealer's inventory. 184
The author of this Survey feels compelled to criticize the amendment to
the Manufactured Housing Standards Act,' 8 5 not so much on substantive
grounds, as on the technical ground that the amendment creates one more
filing location for a specific type of collateral that is not properly cross-
referenced in section 9.302 of the Code.'8 6 Section 9.302 contains a spe-
cific clause for the cross-referencing of other perfection statutes, 187 but the
178. 640 F.2d at 689-92. Upon the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, the trustee is in-
vested with the rights of a hypothetical lien creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 544 (Supp. III 1979).
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.301(a)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1982) provides that
a lien creditor is entitled to priority over a holder of an unperfected security interest.
179. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221f, § 19 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981); TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.404-.406 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
180. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221f, § 190(i) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981).
181. Id.
182. The contents of the standard U.C.C.-I are described in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 9.402(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1982). The form itself is prescribed by the
Texas Secretary of State.
183. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221f, § 19(k) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981) pro-
vides that registration and recordation with the Texas Department of Labor and Standards
serves as notice of liens on manufactured homes. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 9.401(a)(3) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1982) requires financing statements covering inven-
tory to be filed in the office of the secretary of state if filing is the proper method of perfec-
tion. Whether or not filing of a financing statement is the proper method of perfection is
covered in id. § 9.302(c)(2).
184. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221f, §§ 19(b)-(g) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981).
185. Id. art. 5221f.
186. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.302(c)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
187. The statute provides:
The filing of a financing statement otherwise required by this Chapter is
not necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in property subject to
(2) the following statutes of this state: the Certificate of Title Act, as
amended (Article 1436-1 Vernon's Texas Penal Code) [now TEX.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6687-1 (Vernon 1977)]; but during any
period in which collateral is inventory held for sale by a person who is
19821
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list contained in that section has not been amended since its original pas-
sage in 1968 and is now sadly out of date.' 88 In the author's opinion, a
technical corrections bill is needed to help prevent inadvertent good faith
filing errors.
The second amendment' 8 9 provides a uniform filing fee for the perfec-
tion of security interests in timber, minerals, and fixtures. The amendment
provides that the uniform fee shall be $3.00 for the standard financing
statement forms and $6.00 for nonstandard forms "plus, in each case when
the original financing statement was filed pursuant to Subsection (e) of
Section 9.402, an amount equal to the fee prescribed by law for recording
and indexing in the real property records of the county clerk."' 90 The uni-
form fee for the standard and nonstandard forms has been added to the
several Code sections that deal with filing fees.' 91
D. Priorities
Claim of Secured Party Superior to that of Unpaid Cash Seller. In Villa v.
Alvarado State Bank 192 the unpaid cash seller of an automobile was held
to have a claim subordinate to that of a secured party holding a properly
perfected security interest in the after-acquired property of the debtor-
buyer.193 This decision is consistent with that in the well-known final
opinion in Samuels & Co. v. Mahon 94
E Proceedings After Default
Exemplary Damages/or Wrongfid Repossession. Two cases reported dur-
ing the survey period held that a secured party could be liable for the will-
ful and malicious repossession of collateral.' 95 One case involved
substantial damage to a garage by the repossession agent.196 The other
in the business of selling goods of that kind, the filing provisions of this
Chapter (Subchapter D) apply to a security interest m that collateral
created by him as debtor; or Subchapter A, Chapter 35, Title 4, Busi-
ness & Commerce Code ....
Id. (footnotes omitted).
188. The list currently refers only to the Certificate of Title Act, and subchapter A, chap-
ter 35, title 4, Business & Commerce Code. Due to revisions and new acts, the list should
include the motor vehicle Certificate of Title Act (TEx. Rnv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6687-1
(Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1982)); the motor boating Certificate of Title Act (TEx. PARKS &
WILD. CODE ANN. §§ 31.045-.055 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1982)); and the Texas Manufac-
tured Housing Standards Act (TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221(f), § 19 (Vernon Supp.
1982)).
189. 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 325, §§ 1-4, at 908-09.
190. Id.
191. See TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.404-.406 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
192. 611 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ).
193. Id. at 487-88.
194. 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976) (UCC subordinates claim of unpaid seller to that of
individual holding interest properly perfected prior to sale). See also 611 S.W.2d at 487-88.
195. Meyers v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 619 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1981, no writ); Chandler State Bank v. Dorsey, 618 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1981, no writ).
196. Meyers v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 619 S.W.2d 572, 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
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case involved misrepresentations by a secured party concerning the basis
for repossession, and the requirements the debtor had to meet to redeem
the collateral. 97 Both cases are intensely factual in nature, as are most
wrongful repossession cases, 198 and should be read in their entirety.
Discharge of Co-Maker by Wrongful Resale. In O'Hara v. First National
Bank' 99 an accommodation co-maker was discharged from liability on a
note because the secured party failed to give the co-maker notice of the
proposed sale of collateral under section 9.504200 of the Code. Although
not cited by the court, section 3.606201 would lend support to the determi-
nation that a discharge had occurred.
'Rebuttable Presumption" Rule in Improper Sale of Collateral Cases No
Longer Reliable. When a secured party has sold repossessed collateral and
applied the proceeds of sale to the secured debt, a deficiency frequently
results.202 Under the Code, the secured party is entitled to recover this
deficiency from the debtor. 203 A recurring problem in deficiency cases is
that a debtor may be able to show that the secured party sold the collateral
in a way that violated the disposition of collateral rules in section
9.504(c).204 When such a showing has been made by a debtor, a recurring
legal problem has been whether the secured party should be absolutely
barred from recovering a deficiency, or whether some lesser penalty should
be imposed. The courts have split on this question. A number of jurisdic-
tions have barred the recovery of any deficiency upon a showing of credi-
tor misconduct in the sale of collateral. 20 5 Other jurisdictions have
197. Chandler State Bank v. Dorsey, 618 S.W.2d 113, 116 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981,
no writ).
198. Many of the fact patterns that have been held to constitute a wrongful repossession
are discussed in J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 1094-1102 (2d ed. 1980).
199. 613 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ).
200. Id. at 308. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp.
1982) requires that notice of a proposed sale of collateral be given to the debtor, which
includes an accommodation party. Under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.415(e) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968) an accommodation co-maker is given a right of recourse after paying
the instrument, thereby requiring his notification prior to the sale of the collateral.
201. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.606(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) discharges a
party to the instrument with a right of recovery if the holder agrees to release the collateral
acting as security for the instrument without the prior party's consent.
202. See Shuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study ofAutomobile Repossession and
Resale, 22 STAN. L. REV. 20 (1969).
203. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
204. Id. § 9.504(c). The disposition of collateral rules stated in this section may be vio-
lated in any of several ways. A required notice of the sale may not be sent prior to the sale,
Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402 (Ocean County Ct.
1971), aff'd 118 N.J. Super. 521,288 A.2d 872 (Super Ct. App. Div. 1972); the notice may not
be sent at all, O'Hara v. First Nat'l Bank, 613 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1980, no writ); the notice may not be publicly advertised, In re Bishop, 11 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 1079, aft'd, 482 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1973); or the manner of conducting
the sale may be improper, Mercantile Fin. Corp. v. Miller, 292 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
205. See, e.g., Wilmington Trust Co. v. Conner, 415 A.2d 773 (Del. 1980); Herman Ford-
Mercury, Inc. v. Betts, 251 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1977); Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Wathen, 414
A.2d 1261 (Md. 1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Rose, 197 Neb. 392, 249 N.W.2d 723 (1977).
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adopted the rule that if a debtor successfully shows that the secured party
has improperly sold the collateral, a rebuttable presumption arises that the
value of the collateral was equal to the amount of the debt, and the burden
of showing why a lesser amount was received from the sale is placed on the
secured party.20 6 This is commonly called the "rebuttable presumption
rule."
For some years the Texas courts of civil appeals have been applying the
rebuttable presumption rule,207 but this rule has never been directly ap-
proved by the Texas Supreme Court.208  During the survey period the
Texas Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion refusing an application
for writ of error in Ward v. First State Bank20 9 casting great doubt on
whether the rebuttable presumption rule is actually the law in Texas. In
that opinion, the supreme court said:
This action [denying an application for writ of error] should not
be interpreted as an approval of the writing of the court of civil ap-
peals that the "rebuttable presumption" rule applies in Texas ...
This court reserves the question of whether the "rebuttable presump-
tion" rule, or the absolute bar to recovery rule of "no notice, no defi-
ciency" will control in Texas in suits for deficiency on a note after a
secured party has sold the collateral without reasonable notice to
either the debtor, the guarantor of the debt, or both.210
Secured parties should carefully consider the per curiam opinion in Ward
and guard against the risk it represents by following proper notice aild sale
procedures in disposing of collateral after default.
The author should note that, for whatever reason, the per curiam opin-
ion in Ward does not appear in the South Western Reporter, 2d Series, and
the Texas Writs of Error Table shows only that a writ of error was refused,
n.r.e., in the case.211 To the best of the author's knowledge, the per curiam
opinion has not been withdrawn and is currently reported only in the
Texas Supreme Court Journal212 and in the Uniform Commercial Code Re-
206. See, e.g., Valley Mining Corp. Inc. v. Metro Bank, 383 So. 2d 158 (Ala. 1980); Bank
of Okla. v. Little Judy Indus., Inc., 387 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Levers v. Rio
King Land & Inv. Co., 93 Nev. 95, 560 P.2d 917 (1977); Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands
Forest Prod., Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 535 P.2d 1077 (1975).
207. See, e.g., Roylex, Inc. v. E.F. Johnson Co., 617 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ); Tackett v. Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co., 579 S.W.2d 545
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); O'Neil v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 533
S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 551 S.W.2d 32 (Tex.
1977).
208. The only case involving the rebuttable presumption rule that reached the Texas
Supreme Court was O'Neil v. Mack Trucks, Inc. 533 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1974), but this decision was reversed on other grounds, 551 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. 1977), and the
supreme court never reached the question of the propriety of the rebuttable presumption
rule.
209. 605 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980), writ re/'d n.r.e per curiam, 24
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 170 (Dec. 31, 1980).
210. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 170 (Dec. 31, 1980).
211. This is the second error in the Writs of Error Table (13th ed. 1980) thai the author
discovered during the survey period. See note 22 supra. Shepard's Texas Citations also does
not reflect the per curiam opinion in Ward.
212. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 170 (Dec. 31, 1980).
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porting Service.213 The failure to report this opinion may have led to an
erroneous decision in Roylex, Inc. v. E F Johnson Co. 2 14 Although de-
cided after the per curiam opinion in Ward,215 Roylex gave no hint that
the court was aware of the reservations stated by the supreme court in
Ward.216
213. Ward v. First State Bank, 30 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 769 (Tex. 1980).
214. 617 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ) (noncompli-
ance with Code's notice requirement created rebuttable presumption that proceeds from sale
of collateral equalled debt).
215. Ward v. First State Bank, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 170 (Dec. 31, 1980).
216. After this Article was completed, the supreme court answered the question reserved
in Ward by adopting the absolute bar rule of "no notice, no deficiency" in Economics Labo-
ratory, Inc. v. Tannenbaum, 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 210 (March 8, 1982).
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